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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This case has two parts. The first part involves a house on 
2.36 acres located in Howell, Box Elder County, Utah, which was 
owned by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs traded the property as 
a down payment upon the Robinson property located in Salt Lake 
County, a four-plex. The agreed value of the property in Howell 
was $7,500.00. The Hcwell property was deeded to Reuel S. Kohler 
the real estate agent, and his wife, at the request of the Robinsons, 
the owner of the four-plex because of a deal involving the Kohlers 
and Robinsons, 
All of the papers pertaining to the four-plex and the Howell 
property were prepared and left with Mr. Kohler to be held by him, 
the real estate agent, until the deal was consummated. It devel-
oped that the house and lot had been included in a mortgage upon 
Mr, Hansen's farm at Howell, so Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hansen 
entered into a new agreement by the terms of which Hansens conveyed 
to Robinsons a Thunderbird automobile and made a payment as provided 
by the contract in advance ajad agreed to pay the Kohlers' commission 
and that Mr. Kohler was to hold the Howell property as security, for 
his commission. 
The second part of the case involves the Pierces who purchased 
the Howell property from the Kohlers and the Deed from Kohlers to 
Pierces was put on record the day before the Lis Pendens was filed 
against the Kohlers. The Pierces appeared and requested permission 
to be made Intervening Defendants and Cross Claimants at the time of 
the pre-trial, claiming damages because of the filing of the Lis Pendens. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court found in favor of the Defendant, Kohler, and against 
the Plaintiff, no cause of action (R. 490-491) 
The Court awarded damages in favor of the Pierces and against the 
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Plaintiff in the sum of $4,166.05 plus interest and costs. (R. 464) 
That on a Motion for a New Trial, (R. 467-468), the amount was 
reduced by $1,500.00, making a new Judgment of $2,596.75. (R. 499). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs ask for reversal of the Judgment in favor of Kohlers 
and against Plaintiffs, Hansens. 
That the Judgment in favor of the Intervening Defendants, Pierces, 
be reversed and their Counterclaim be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I am dividing the Statement of Facts into two portions. The 
first one pertaining to the deals between Hansen and Kohler as to 
the Howell property and the second part is the claim for damages of 
Pierces against the Hansens for filing a Lis Pendesn. 
Marvin W. Hansen, Plaintiff, owned the property at Howell, Utah 
worth $7,500.00, which was the agreed sales price. Mr. Kohler, a 
real estate agent, had a listing on a four-plex in Salt Lake County 
owned by Mr. Kent Robinson. Negotiations were carried on and an 
Earnest Money Agreement was entered into between Mr. Hansen and Mr. 
Robinson, (Exhibit 1, R. 9-10). 
By the terms of the Earnest Money Receipt, the four-plex was 
to be conveyed to Marvin W. Hansen by Kent Robinson and Kent Robinson 
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was to pay the commission to Mr. Kohler of 6 percent on $39f400.00, 
total purchase price as provided in the Earnest Money Receipt, 
(Exhibit lf R. 9-10), amounting to $2,364.00. The down payment 
was $7,500.00, which was the agreed value of the land and home 
belonging to the Hansens at Howell, Utah. Hansens also agreed to 
pay on Robinsons' equity at the rate of $310.00 per month with 
a balloon payment of $2,000.00 on May 15, 1969. 
That thereafter on April 1, 1969, a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, (Exhibit 2), was entered into and two Deeds were made 
out at the request of Robinson to and in the name of Reuel S. Kohler 
and his wife and delivered to Mr. Kohler as the closing agent and 
real estate agent of the parties. (Exhibit 3 and 4). A closing 
statement was given to the seller and the buyer and on the Hansens 
closing statement, they were given credit for $7,500.00 for the 
Howell Property, (Exhibit 5), the contract being in accordance with 
the Earnest Money Receipt. 
There was a side deal between Mr. Kohler and Mr. Robinson, by 
the terms of which Mr. Kohler was to receive the Howell property as 
part payment of his commission and in addition thereto, Mr. Kohler 
was to pay to Mr. Robinson, $2,000.00, for the Howell property. (R.5), 
and that was why the Deed was made out from the Hansens to Kohlers. 
-4. 
It developed that the house and the 2.36 acres was included 
in a mortgage on the 450 acre farm owned by Mr. Hansen. When Mr. 
Robinson and Mr. Hansen found out about the mortagage, they signed 
a memorandum that inasmuch as the lien could not be cleared at that 
time, the Hansens authorized the advance of $1,000.00 of the 
$2,000.00 balloon payment of the 15th day of May, to be paid to 
Robinson to show his good faith. 
Mr. Robinson proposed to take an automobile owned by Mr. Hansen 
a new Ford Thunderbird, (R. 13 and 14), valued at $5,000.00 to $5,300.00 
(R. 28-29). Mr. Robinson proposed to Mr. Hansen that he give him 
the Thunderbird and pay the sales commission to Mr. Kohler in place 
of the Howell property (R. 13, 27-37), and that Mr. Hansen could 
pay Mr. Kohler the sales commission at a later date and that there 
would be $1,000.00 of the $2,000.00 balloon payment paid immediately 
to Mr. Robinson. That Mr. Robinson was to take the Hansen car and 
shop it to see what it was worth. Mr. Robinson proposed to take 
the car, Mr. Hansen was to assume the commission and that Mr. Kohler 
retained the possession of the Warranty Deed as security to pay his 
commission. 
On June 12, 1969, Mr. Kohler prepared (Exhibit 8), which 
provided: "Sellers agree to accept as part of down payment a 1967 
Ford Thunderbird automobile. Buyer agrees to pay any and all indebtedness 
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off against said vehicle and transfer clear title to sellers. 
Possession of automobile to be transferred on May 10, 1969. This is 
a condition of the completaion of the sale of four-plex located 
at 562 North 7th West, Salt Lake City, Utah. Failure to comply with 
this agreement constitutes a default in above said property.'' 
Paragraph No. 2 provided: "Buyers agree to transfer title to 
home and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S. Kohler and Dolores 
M. Kohlerf his wife. Warranty Deed was executed April 1, 1969." 
This Deed was being held in trust at that time by Mr. Kohler. 
There was no agreement to change the status. 
That under the terms of the original listing agreement, Mr. 
Robinson was to pay the commission to Mr. Kohler. There is nothing 
said in the Exhibits 7 and 8 as to who was to pay Mr. Kohler's 
commission, but the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Hansen is that 
he was to pay the commission and that the property heretofore 
conveyed to Mr. Kohler in trust was to be held as security for the 
payment of Mr. Kohler's commission. Mr. Hansen asked why the Deed 
was made to Kohler and they told him that they had a little deal 
of their own pertaining to this property and for him to convey 
it directly to Mr. Kohler and they would handle the Warranty Deed 
themselves, which did not change Mr. Hansen's basic program (R. 23). 
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There was a very friendly relationship among the three of them. 
Mr. Hansen had delivered the car to Mr. Robinson on May 10, 1969, 
and the new agreement was not signed until June 12, 1969, and during 
the entire period of this readjustment, the Deed to the property 
was being held by Mr. Kohler, which was always in trust. 
Mr. Hansen testified pertaining to this transaction as follows: 
"Well, this is the conversation that took place in the 
office between Kent Robinson, Mr. Kohler and Myself, and this is 
where we agreed that I would pay the sales commission and that Mr. 
Kohler would hold the Warranty Deed. (R. 16) 
Q. Is there anything in the agreement in regard to the 
commission? 
A. The way this was worded is what I questioned at the time of 
the wording, and then it was right then it was stated, "We all agree 
to that." 
Q. What was stated at the time? 
A. That I was to pay Mr. Kohler the commission. He was to hold 
my property for collateral." 
That the assuming of the commission and the transferring of the car 
was to be the $7,500.00 down payment. Mr. Hansen did not intend to 
give property of $7,500.00 for the commission (R. 28) 
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Mr. Robinson told Mr. Hansen that the blue book value of the 
automobile was $5,300.00 (R. 28) The Thunderbird automobile was 
not paid for and Mr. Hansen agreed to make payments, which he 
did. 
Mr. Hansfen offered to get the cash on his insurance policy 
to pay the real estate commission, but Mr. Kohler stated that he 
would be very secure holding the property for his collateral on the 
commission and that he would continue to try to sell the Howell 
property and that Mr. Kohler was to get his commission on the 
Howell property when he sold it. (R. 30). 
That the keys were given to Mr. Kohler when they completed the 
first deal, (R. 32), before they found the encumbrance against the 
entire farm. Hansen talked to Kohler as to what he owed him 
and he owed him $7,500.00 less sales commission. They talked before 
and after they signed the agreement. The arrangement was never 
dropped. It was talked about at every conversation between Kohler 
and Hansen. (R. 33 and 34). 
If Mr. Kchler is allowed to retain the Howell property, then he 
is being unjustly enriched. 
That after the deal was closed, Mr. Kohler came to where Mr. 
Hansen was working and wanted to know about the sewage system and he 
said he was very small when it was laid out and he drew a diagram. 
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Mr. Kohler said that he had someone on contract, a prospective 
buyer for the house. At that time, and he did not tell Mr. Hansen 
who, that if they get the sewer system working satisfactorily for 
the prospective buyer, then he felt that he had it sold and we 
could get together on a settlement. This conversation occurred 
about the middle of August or the middle of September. (R. 17), 
About two weeks after that, Mr. Hansen and Mr. Kohler had a 
conversation in which Mr. Kohler said he had not settled anything 
absolutely on the place, but he would be in touch with Mr. Hansen. 
Mr. Kohler was going to try to sell the Howell property for Mr. 
Hansen. (R. 18). 
Sometime thereafter, about six or seven months later, Mr. Hansen 
went to the office of Mr. Kohler and Mr. Kohler then told Mr. Hansen 
he was not going to make any settlement. He said, "You will just 
have to sue me. I am not going to make a settlement. " (R. 18-190• 
Then Mr. Hansen got in touch with the Department of Business 
Regulation, Real Estate Division, and filed a Complaint by sending 
them a letter (R. 19, Exhibit 9). 
Mr. Kohler answered the Complaint and the Real Estate Board 
notified Mr. Hansen that he should bring a suit. (R. 20) and (Exhibit 24), 
Minutes of Board Meeting. 
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That the mortgage to the First Security Bank was paid as a 
result of the provision in the agreement of the sale. Mr. Hansen 
sold the property with the understanding that the mortgage would be 
paid off. That thq mortgage to the bank on the farm was paid on 
November 9f 1970. (R. 36) 
That Mr. Hansen's version of the transaction was stated in 
response to the Court's question to him on Page 37 as follows: 
"THE COURT: I had one question. Why did you agree to 
transfer your 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile to Mr. Robinson 
as part of the down payment? 
A. Well, in other words, that takes the place of the Howell 
property. That and the sales commission on the four-plex, which 
Robinson would normally pay to Mr. Kohler, I was to pay that and 
the car constituting the $7,500.00 down payment." 
PART II OF THE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THIS IS THE SECTION OF THE BRIEF WHICH DISCUSSES THE FACTS WHICH 
PERTAIN TO OHE CLAIM OF THE PIERCES AGAINST THE HANSENS. 
After Hansen and Robinson consummated the deal, Mr. Hansen 
would ask for a report from Mr. Kohler and he told him that it looked 
like he was going to make a sale of the Howell property. Finally, 
Mr. Kohler told Mr. Hansen he would not make settlement with him and 
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he would have to sue him. (R. 18, 19). The following transactions 
occurred pertaining to the Howell property: 
September 5, 1969, a Lease was entered into between Kohlers 
and the Pierces. (R. 91, Exhibit 10). 
October 1, 1970, a Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered 
into between the Kohlers and Pierces. (R. 93, 94, Exhibit 11). 
November 9, 1970, the mortgage on the faim which included 
the house was paid to the First Security Bank. (R. 36). 
April 2, 1971, Complaint letter of Hansen to the State of Utah, 
Department of Business Regulation, Real Estate Division. (R. 19, 
Exhibit 9). 
May 4, 1971, letter from Kohler to Real Estate Division, offered 
in evidence, not received. (R. 138, Exhibit 25). 
Minutes of Division of Real Estate consisting of minutes of June 
16, 1971, June 17, 1971, June 24, 1971, and August 18, 1971, at which 
meeting the Board recommended, "that Mr. Kohler pay Mr. Hansen $4,686.00 
(this is the difference between the $7,500.00 value placed on the 
home and the commission of $2,364.00 and the commission to Mr. Kohler 
of $450.00 for selling the Howell Home). Mr. Kohler is to inform the 
Real Estate Division within ten days if this matter has been 
satisfactorily concluded." (R. 136, Exhbiit 24). 
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October 7, 1971, Complaint in this case was filed. 
October 18, 1971, Deed from Kohler to Pierces, (Exhibit 12} and 
Real Estate Morrgage to the Farm Home Administration. (Exhibit 14). 
October 18, 1971, two title insurance policies, one to protect 
mortagagor, Farm Home Administration and one to protect the Pierces. 
(Exhibit 14 and 15) 
October 19, 1971, Lis Pendens was filed. (Exhibit 16) 
March 12, 1971, Marv Hansen and his attorney talked to Mrs. 
Pierce at Howell, Utah. Conversation at Howell, Mrs. Pierce said 
that they had a Deed and the Hansens informed Mrs. Pierce that they 
had a lawsuit against Kohler, but that the Pierces had nothing to 
worry about as long as they had title insurance because they would 
be protected by the title insurance. 
March 28, 1972, Earnest Money Receipt. (R. 105, Exhibit 17), Nicholas 
to Pierce. Sales Price $12,300.00. 
April, 1972, Pierces moved to Texas. (R. 99, 168). 
May 30, 1972, Letter from Mr. Roe to Attorney Hadfield setting out 
that Mr, Roe did not consider that the Lis Pendens was an encumbrance 
on the property and a letter from Hadfield to Roe in which he stated 
that he did not consider the Lis Pendens an encumbrance. (Exhibit 21). 
November 13, 1972, conversation of Mr. and Mrs. Pierce and Mr. Robbins 
in his office. Mr. Robbins advised them that they should get in touch 
with their title insurance company and if the title insurance company 
would not do anything,, then they should consult an attorney. 
December 11, 1972, Pre-trial, Pierces attorney orally asked to 
file Motion. The first written notice that Kansens had of a claim 
being made by the Pierces was Answer and Motion to Intervene and 
Counterclaim filed on January 2# 1973, 
We have re-read the Cross Complaint and Counterclaim, (R. 319-320, 
321-322, 324) and there is nothing in the pleadings which asks that the 
Lis Pendens be removed. The entire pleadings and the case pertain 
to collection of damages. 
March 6, 1973, Judgment of D & B Electric against Pierces was 
abstracted in the District Court of Box Elder County. (R. 228, 232). 
The sale of the property in the sum of $12,500.00 from the 
Griffiths which deal was not consummated because of the taxes and the 
Judgment against the Pierces. (R. 228, 229, 231). 
June 19, 1973, Preliminary title report of 0. Dee Lund of the sale 
to the Griffiths, (R. 227, 228), which report sets out that the Lis 
Pendens was not a lien and he advised the Griffiths that they could 
buy the property because the Lis Pendens only affected after acquired 
property. 
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ARGUMENT 
PART I 
POINT I 
PROPERTY CONVEYED IN TRUST AS SECURITY. THAT IF KOHLER KEEPS THE 
PROCEEDS FROM THE HOWELL PROPERTY, HE HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED. 
Plaintiffs ask in their Complaint that the defendants be required 
to reconvey the property to the Plaintiffs or if they cannot reconvey 
the property, then they pay to the Plaintiffs the difference between 
$7,500.00 and the commission together with interest at the rate of 
seven percent, and the said amount be declared to be a lien upon the 
property and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just 
and equitable and costs. 
The original deal and the original Deed was made out from Hansens 
to Kohlers. Kohler was a real estate agent and the closing agent 
and was to hold the Deed to the Howell property and all instruments 
in trust until the deal was consummated. There was nothing in the 
subsequent writings which changed the relationship of Kohler as Trustee. 
The property in a regular deal should have been deeded to Mr. 
Robinson, but because of a side deal between Kohler and Robinson, it 
was ddeded to Mr. Kohler. Mr. Kohler never at any time had any interest 
in the property except his real estate commissions. 
If Mr. Kohler is to retain the property, he has been unjustly 
enriched in the approximate sum of $5,000.00. 
Therefore, there is either a resulting trust or a constructive trust. 
-14-
i 
Mr. Kohler only had in the Howell property his sales commission. In 
the first deal, he was to pay $2,000.00 to Robinson and his commissions 
before he got the Howell property. 
We have numerous cases in Utah pertaining to resulting and 
constructive trusts. In the case of Hawkins vs. Perry, 253 P. 2df 
page 372, it cites other Utah cases. I will discuss the Hawkins vs 
Perry case for the general rule of law and make short comments about 
the cases cited therein. The Plaintiff, Hawkins, was a boy sixteen 
years of age who had saved $300.00f He gave this money to his 
uncle, who was a minister and askedi him to buy a piece of property 
and the title to the property was taken in the name of his uncle 
and his uncle's wife. The Court discusses in this case the 
distinction between a resulting or constructive trust and on page 
875 ®f thu Pacific the Court states: 
"The constructive trust * * * is to be dis-
tinguished from a resulting trust. Where A's 
money is used by B with A's consent in purchasing 
property in the name of B, a resulting trust 
arises in favor of A. Where A's money is used 
by B without A's consent in purchasing property 
in B's name, B holdsthe property upon a construct-
ive trust for A. In the former case, the result-
ing trust arises because of the presumed intention 
of the parties. In the latter case, the construct-
ive trust is imposed upon B to prevent his unjust 
enrichment." 
We contend there was an agency between Kohlor and Hansen and there 
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was a confidential relationship and that Mr. Kohler was unjustly 
enriched. He got a $7,500.00 house at Howell, Utah, which ultimately 
was mortgaged for $10,500.00. for his commission of $2,364.00 and 
on page 375 of the Hawkins v. Perry case which quotes from a Utah 
case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95 P. 527, note [4] states: 
"[4] Equity imposes a constructive trust to pre-
vent one from unjustly profiting through fraud or 
the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary 
or confidential relationship. The Utah decision 
of Chadwick v. Arnold declares * * * that a 
trust ex maleficio [constructive trust] arises 
whenever a person acquires the legal title to 
property of another by means of an intentional false 
or fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for 
a certain purpose, and having thus obtained the 
title, retains and claims the property as his own." 
It is now well recognized that actual fraud is 
not necessary, but may be presumed where there 
is a relationship of confidence between the parties 
to a transaction and there are "other circumstances 
tending to show that some advantage had been 
taken by the dominant party with a consequent abuse 
of confidence." 
In Haws v. Jensen, we quote: 
"A constructive trust will be imposed even though 
at the time of the transfer the transferee intended 
to perform the agreement, and even though he was not 
guilty of undue influence in procuring the convey-
ance. The abuse of the confidential relation 
consists merely in the failure of the transferee 
to perform his promise." 
In the case of Haws v. Jensen, 209 P. 2d 229, 116 U. 212, a mother 
conveyed property to her daughter for the purpose of the property being 
maintained for the rest of her brothers and sisters. The daughter 
died and her husband claimed the property. He maintained that the 
-16-
statute of frauds appliedf but the Court on page 231 states: 
"[If 2] Admittedly there is no writing evidencing 
Mrs. Haws' intention that the property conveyed 
by her be held in trust by Amber. Howeverf under 
certain circumstances existing at the time a 
conveyance in trust is made, no writing evidenc-
ing an intent to create a trust is required. In 
those instances, equity will impress a construct-
ive trust upon the property in favor of the person 
or persons designated by the grantor as the bene-
ficiary or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A 
constructive trustf being an equitable remedy to 
prevent unjust enrichment, arises by operation 
of law and is not within the statute of frauds. 
Section 45(1) (b)f of the Restatement of the Law 
of Trusts is applicable to the facts of the instant 
case: 
' (1) Where the owner of an interest in land 
transfers in inter vivos to another in trust for 
a third person, but no memorandum properly evidencing 
the intention to create a trust is signed, and the 
transferee refuses to perform the trustf the 
transferee holds the interest upon a constructive 
trust for third person.'" 
And furtherf on Page 232f the Court says: 
"[5] the defendant's second contention that the lower 
court erred in admitting parol testimony tending 
to establish an oral trust must also fail. Restate-
ment of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 38 (3) states: 
'If the owner of property transfers it intervivos 
to another person by a written instrument in which 
it is not declared that the transferee is to take 
the property for his own benefit or that he is to 
hold it in trust# intrinsic evidence may be 
admitted to show that he was intended to hold the 
property in trust either for the transferor or for 
a third party.' 
'Ttfe similarly held in Cory v. Robertsf 82 Utah 445, 
25 P. 2d 940; Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah 133# 
141 P. 2d 882; and in Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 
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534, 116 P. 2d 772, that a deed absolute on its face 
can be shown to have been intended to be in trust." 
In the case of Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 49 P.2d 403, 87 
U. 364, on Page 404, second paragraph, first column, line 8, it says: 
"While the fiduciary relationship is a prerequis-
ite to the creation of a constructive trust, such 
as we are here considering, yet the trust does not 
arise until that relationship has been betrayed 
or violated. It is the confidential relationship 
plus the abuse of the confidence thus imposed, that 
authorized equity to construct a trust for the 
benefit of the party whose confidence has been abused." 
(citing cases) 
"It is not the nominal, but the actual relation of 
the parties which must be examined in order to 
determine whether there has been a breach of 
trust. The fact that the parties may have been 
long standing friends or neighbors (which is adverted 
to by some of the text-writers) may be one of the 
elements to be weighed, but in its last analysis 
the test is the reposing of confidence--in the sense 
of trust-- and its abuse, which must determine the 
result." 
We quote further from Page 404, paragraph [3]: 
"[3] It is true that upon the establishment of 
certain fiduciary relationships and transactions 
between the parties to that relationship, equity will 
presume fraud, the abuse of confidence, and place 
the burden of proving good faith and fairness upon 
the dominant party in the relationship. In such cases 
the presumption of fraud may be based upon the 
relationship alone and relieves the party from 
proving the fraud, but the fraud is nevertheless 
an essential element. By the presumption equity 
supplies that element. The relationships wherein 
such presumption has been indulged are parent and child, 
principal and agent, attorney and client." 
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There is a relationship of principal and agent between Hansens 
and Kohlers and Kohler was bound not to take advantage of Mr. Hansen 
by having the real estate in his name. 
In the case of Corey v. Roberts# 25 P. 2df Page 940, second column 
bottom of page, paragraph 3f the Court says: 
"3. Mortgages, Key 32(6) 
In determining whether deed absolute on face is 
intended as mortgage, court should consider existence 
of continuing obligation to pay debt; relative 
values; contemporaneous and subsequent acts and 
declarations of parties; form of written evidences 
of transactions and character of testimony; 
relationship of parties; and apparent purposes to be 
accomplished." 
On Page 947 of the Pacific, first column, last paragraph, the Court 
says: 
"Whether the instrument should be treated as 
a deed or mortgage of course depends upon the 
facts and circumstances of the transaction, 
the object and purpose for which it was given and 
received, and whether it was given as security or 
for a bargain and sale of the land.". Duerden v. 
Solomon, 33 Utah 468, 473, 94 P. 978; Thomas v. 
Ogden State Bank (Utah) 13 P. 2d 636, 639." 
On Page 948, second column, bottom of first paragrpah, the Court says: 
"Any marked undervaluation in price will vitiate 
a release or conveyance of the mortgagor interest." 
This case is a long case detailing a lot of facts and holds that 
the deeds which were given in the case were merely mortgages and not 
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a conveyance. 
In this casef we have a case in which the property was of greater 
value than the debt which was to be paid to Mr. Kohler. 
In the case of Newel v. Halloran 250 P. 986f on page 988f para-
graph 3f second paragraph, we quote: 
"Courts of equity have carefully refrained from 
defining the particular instances of fiduciary 
nrelations in such manner that other and perhaps 
new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an 
overwhelming weight of authority, that the 
principle extends to every possible case in which 
a fiduciary relation exists as a fact in which 
there is confidence reposed on one side, and the 
resulting superiority and influence on the other, 
the relation and the duties involved in it need not 
be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic or 
merely personal." 
In the case of Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 212 P. 526, this was the 
case involving the promotion of a mining claim and certain property 
was conveyed by the plaintiff as his share of the money to be used in 
the promotion. That the defendant was to raise further money which 
he did not do. He conveyed the property and the court held it was a 
resulting trust. On page 529, paragraph No. 3, we quote: 
"Thus, if one party procures the legal title to 
property from another by fraud or misrepresentation 
or concealment, or if a party makes use of such 
influential or confidential relation which he holds 
towards the owner of the legal title, to obtain 
such legal title from him upon more advantageous 
terms than he could otherwise have obtained it, 
equity will convert such party thus obtaining 
property into a trustee. If a person obtains the 
legal title to property by such arts or acts 
or circumstances of circumvention imposition, 
or fraud, or if he obtains it by virtue of a 
confidential relation and influence under such 
circumstances that he ought not, according to the 
rules of equity and good conscience as administered 
in chancery, to hold and enjoy the beneficial 
interest of the property, courts of equity in 
order to administer complete justice between the 
parties will raise a trust by construction out 
of such circumstances or relations; and this trust 
they will fasten upon the conscience of the offending 
party, and will convert him, into a trustee of 
the legal title, and order him to hold it or to 
execute the trust in such manner as to protect 
the rights of the defrauded party and promote the 
safety and interests of society. Such trusts are 
called constructive trusts." 
The same principle is enunciated in almost the same 
language in 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.), Section 
1044. 
The second headnote to Henderson v. Murray, 108 Minn. 
76, 121 N.W. 214, 133 Am. St. Rep. 412, announces 
the same general principle as follows: 
"Where, however, a party obtains the legal title 
to land from another by fraud, or by taking 
advantage of confidential or fiduciary relations, 
or in any other unconscientious manner, so that he 
cannot justly retain the property, equity will 
impress a constructive trust upon it in favor of 
the party who is equitably entitled to it." 
This general equitable principle is recognized by 
all of the authorities. This court is committed to 
it. See Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah, 48, 95 Pac. 527 
See, also 39 Cyc. 172 et seq.;Pollard v. Mc Kenney, 
69 Neb. 742, 96 N. W. 679, 101 N.W. 9." 
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In this case there was confidence reposed in Kohler by Hansen 
giving him the Deed to his property before the deal was closed. 
Of coursef he was holding the property as escrow agent. Alsof 
Hansen had conveyed the title to the car to Mr. Robinson prior to the 
time of signing any papers. 
PART I 
POINT II 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO BEARING UPON THIS CASE. 
They had raised in this casef the question of the statute of 
fraud. We have a number of Utah cases which hold that the Statute 
of Fraud does not apply to resulting or constructive trust. Anderson v 
Cereone at 180 p. 586 on page 588, fourth paragraph, the Court says: 
"[4] Appellant's plea of the statute of frauds is not 
supported by authority. The single case cited 
(Skeen v. Marriott, 22 Utah, 73, 61 Pac. 296) 
related to an express trust and therefore is 
not in point. The trust in this case is a 
resulting trust, to which the statute of 
frauds does not apply. Chambers v. Emery, supra." 
Also, see Chambers v. Emeiy, 13 Utah, 374, 45 P. 192, Skeen v. 
Marriott 22 U. 73, 61 P. 296. 
Also see Chactorick v. Arnold 95 P. 527, at page 532, where the Court 
says: 
"In Bispham's Principles of Equity (7th Ed.) 
Section 218 in speaking of the enforcement of trusts ex 
maleficio, the rule is stated that "the ground of 
these decisions is that the statute of frauds is 
not to be used as a shield for fraud; and that 
i 
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where a party has by his promise to buy or hold 
or dispose of real estate for the benefit of 
anotherf induced action or forbearance by reliance 
upon such promise it would be a fraud that the promise 
should not be enforced; and the method of enforce-
ment will be through the machinery of a trust." 
In the case of George R. Taylor v. Eva Turnerf 492 P. 2d 1343, 
27 U. 2d 39 they hold that the deed that was given was in fact a 
security transaction and held that there was a trust and on page 
1346, the Court discusses the question of the statute of frauds and 
says as follows: 
"Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
its determination that the plaintiffs were the 
owners of the real property in Salina, Utah, and the 
defendant held the property in trust to secure 
certain funds which were paid to plaintiffs. 
Defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds, Section 25-
5-1, U.C.A. 1953; he urges that there was no 
instrument in writing concerning this alleged trust 
relating to real property."-
Section 25-5-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be 
construed * * * to prevent any trust from arising 
or being extinguished by implication or operation 
of law. 
2 
In Wasatch Mining Co. v. Jennings this court construed 
the foregoing statute and stated that trusts arising 
by implication or operation of law are expressly 
excluded from the effects of the Statute of Frauds 
and a deed of conveyance, though absolute in form, 
if given to secure a debt, is in equity treated 
as a mortgage—a trust by operation of law. 
The Restatement, Trusts (2d) Section 44, provides: 
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(1) Where the owner of an interest in land trans-
fers it inter vivos to another in trust for the 
transferor but no memorandum properly evidencing 
the intention to create a trust is signed, as 
required by the Statute of Frauds, and the trans-
feree refuses to perform the trust, the transferee 
holds the interest upon a constructive trust for 
the transferor, if 
(c) the transfer was made as security for an 
indebtedness of the transferor. 
[4] The trial court did not err in its determina-
tion that the deed, although absolute in form, was 
in fact executed as security for a loan of money. 
Defendant was a constructive trustee, who held 
title to secure the funds advanced to pla.:j.ntiffs. 
Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P. 527, 34 U. 48, on page 532 of the Pacific, 
the Court says: 
"The relief granted by courts of equity, where a 
trust ex maleficio is raised, is not founded on 
the specific performance of the oral contract, 
but upon the principle that equity turns the fradu-
lent procurer of a legal title into a trustee to 
get at him. That is to say, courts of equity, in 
order to administer complete justice between the 
parties, will raise a trust by construction out 
of the circumstances and relations and this trust 
they will fasten upon the conscience of the 
offending party and will convert him into a 
trustee of the legal title and order him to 
hold it for the benefit of the owner ot t^o 
execute the trust in such manner as to protect 
the rights of the defrauded party. The rule is 
well stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 
supra, that "equity does not pretend to enforce 
verbal promises in the face of the statute, it 
endeavors to prevent and punish fraud by taking 
from the wrongdoer the fruits of his deceit, 
and it accomplishes this object by its beneficial 
far-reaching doctrine of constructive trusts." 
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In the case of Wheelwright v. Roman 165 Pacific 513, o n Page 
516f second column# second paragraph the Court says: 
"In Cooney v. Glynn, supra, in the course of the 
opinion the law is stated thus: 
It has been established by a number of decisions 
in this state that where confidential relations 
exist between two parties, and one of them 
executes a conveyance of real estate to the 
other, upon a parol promise by the other that 
he will hold it for the benefit of the grantor, or 
for the benefit of some third person in whom 
the grantor is interested, there being no other 
consideration for the conveyance, a trust arises by 
operation of law in favor of the grantor, or in 
favor of the third person, for whom, the property 
is to be held. It is the violation of the parol 
promise which constitutes the fraud upon which the 
trust arises. If made in good faith, and if it 
is of a continuing nature* the performance of it 
for a time does not prevent a trust from arising 
when it is broken and repudiated/' 
In the case of Acott v. Tomlirison 337 P. 2d 720, and 9 U. 2d 71, 
the Court held on page 724: 
"From the summary of facts just stated, there is 
ample basis for the determination made by the 
trial court that the defendant agreed to hold the 
property under an express trust; or alternatively, 
that the transaction was so unfair and lacking 
in disclosure of material facts to plaintiffs 
to require the imposition of a constructive trust 
on the property for their benefit." 
And also on Page 724, second column, second paragraph sixth line: 
"The gist of his contention is that the plaintiffs 
trusted him when they should not have done so. 
It does not lie in his mouth to thus claim advant-
age of his own wrong and reap a reward for deception. 
The very essence of trust is that confidence may 
be reposes in the trustee." 
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In this casef Hansen should certainly have not trusted Kohler. 
Barrett v. Vickers 116 P. 2d 772f 100 Utah 534. This is the 
case in which the father owned the property in his lifetime. The 
property was foreclosed. The father died. He owned a ranchf but it 
was mortgaged to the State of Utah. The State of Utah foreclosed on 
it. After the foreclosuref one of his sons purchased the property. 
The contention is made that he purchased it for all the Vickers child-
ren. They held it to be a trust on Page 775, first column, paragraph 
No, 2f which reads as follows: 
"It excepts from the requirement of writing, trusts 
arising by "act of operation of law." There is 
no question in this State about that matter. Parol 
e vidence is admissible to show a trust relationship 
by operation of law. Cory v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 
25 P. 2d 940." 
i 
In the case of Kitt v. Kitt, 294 P. 2d 791, 4 Utah 2d, 384, 
which was the case involving an appeal from a Judgment imposing a 
resulting trust on land acquired in the name of appellant father from 
the State in 1939 for $3,500.00 in favor of respondent sons. 
The contention was that theyhad the following defenses and we 
quote second paragraph, page 792, and the first part of paragraph 1 
and 2 as follows: 
"Counsel for appellant earnestly urges that 1) 
respondents did not contribute enough to the 
purchase price as would justify a resulting 
trust in their favor, and that 2) respondent's 
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evidence was indefinite and conflicting as to 
negate such a trust, and 3) that anyway, any 
claim that respondents asserted was barred by 
a) the statute of frauds and b) the statute of 
limitations. 
[lf2] There appears to be sufficient clear and 
convincing evidence in the lengthy record, which 
if believed by the lower court, would justify a 
declaration of trust in favor of respondents 
and the conclusion that neither of the defensive 
statutes mentioned would apply." 
Child v. Child 332 P. 2d 981, 8 Utah 2d 261, states that the 
father bought a piece of property and borrowed money from his son 
and put the title in the boy's name. The Court held that there was 
a resulting trust and that the father was entitled to the property. 
On page 987, paragraph 11, the Court says: 
"(11) Upon the basis of the facts as found, equity 
and good conscience would not permit one in 
Eugene's position to reap the benefits of his 
father's foresight, planning and efforts simply 
because his father placed title in him to assure 
him that his loan would be repaid. It was to 
avoid any such injustice that the device of 
resulting trust had its origin. Under the 
agreement as determined by the trial court a 
trust resulted in favor of Plaintiff Harry Child." 
Hansen expected Mr. Kohler to make a settlement with him, which 
he didn't do and when he didn't make a settlement, he went to the real 
estate board and then the real estate board told him that he would have 
to determine the matter by suit because Kohler would not pay him. 
Hansen was the person who caused the mortgage to be paid after 
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closing the deal. 
PART II OF THE BRIEF 
IN PART II OF THE BRIEF WE WILL DISCUSS THE LIABILITY IF ANY OF THE 
HANSENS TO THE PIERCES. 
IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FACTS PROVEN TO 
CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER OF TITLE. TO HAVE SLANDER OF 
TITLE, THERE ARE FOUR NECESSARY ELEMENTS. IF ANY ONE IS LACKING, IT WOULD 
PREVENT RECOVERY. IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT ALL FOUR ELEMENTS ARE 
LACKING. THE FOUR ELEMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
FIRST 
THE LIS PENDENS IS PRIVILEGED BECAUSE IT IS PART OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS. 
SECOND 
LIS PENDENS HAS NO EFFECT ON CONVEYANCES MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF 
THE LIS PENDENS. 
THIRD 
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE FALSE AND CONTAIN FALSE ALLE-
GATIONS. 
FOURTH 
FOR THERE TO BE A CAUSE OF ACTION, THERE MUST BE MALICE. 
We will discuss each of these points separately numbered Point I, 
Point II, Point III, and Point IV. 
POINT I 
THE LIS PENDENS IS PRIVELEGED BECAUSE IT IS PART OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS. 
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That the Deed from the Kohlers to the Pierces was filed on the 
18th day of Octoberf 1971, at 3:30 p.m. and the Lis Pendens was 
filed on the 19th day of October, 1971# at 10:30 a.m., which was 
mailed from Salt Lake City, to Brigham City. That the filing of 
the Complaint and the filing of the Lis Pendens is a judicial proceed, 
ing and is therefore privileged. The Complaint was filed October 7# 1971. 
At 53 C.J.S. under Libel and Slander, Section 277# Privilege, 
Page 397f it states: 
"277. Privilege 
Defamatory matter published in due course of a 
judicial proceedings, pertinent to the inquiry, 
is absolutely privileged and will not sustain an 
action for slander of title; also in such actions 
the defendant may be immune from liability on the 
ground that the communication is qualifiedly 
privileged. 
As in case of defamation against the person, 
discussed supra s 104, it has been held that de-
famatory matter published in the course of a 
judicial proceeding, pertinent or material to 
the inquiry, is absolutely privileged, and will 
not sustain an action for slander of title. 
Also in these actions defendant may be immune 
from liability on the ground that the communication 
is qualifiedly privileged. and it has been stated 
that the rules governing communications qualifiedly 
privileged are the same in slander of title as 
in ordinary libel and slander. A communication 
disparaging another's title or property is qualifiedly 
privileged if the publication was honestly made 
by defendant, believing it to be true, and there 
was a reasonable occasion or exigency in the conduct 
of his own affairs in matters where his interest 
99 
was concerned, which fairly warranted the publication. 
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Thus an assertion by the defendant that he 
has some right, title or interest in the property, 
irade in an honest belief of its truth, defendant 
supposing that he is entitled to the interest he 
asserts, is qualifiedly privileged and no action 
for slander of the title can be maintained, although 
the statements are in fact untrue. If defendant, 
believing himself to have an exclusive patent, 
issues a notice of an alleged infringement by 
plaintiff in good faith as a warning against an 
invasion of his rights, a mistake on his part as to 
the validity of his claim will not render him 
liable to an action. So the discontinuance 
or loss of a suit with respect to property will 
not render the person bringing it liable for 
slander of title where he had reasonable grounds 
for believing that he had a good cause of action. 
Applying the privilege doctrine as set out above to the present 
case, the Lis Pendens, is part of the judicial proceedings and there 
is nothing in this record or the pleadings that is false. (Complaint 
256, 257, 258). That the Complaint states that the property 
was sold. That all the facts in the Complaint have been determined 
to be facts, except the conclusions of ownership and in the prayer 
of the Complaint it sets out that if the property cannot be reconveyed, 
then the amount of damages was to be determined. 
We submit that there is nothing in the pleadings or the testimony 
of any of the parties that the facts are untrue. We alleged in the 
Complaint that the plaintiff has offered to pay Mr. Kohler the commiss-
ions, but that Mr. Kohler has refused to reconvey the propertyand that 
( 
the Plaintiff is informed that he has sold the property. 
When this case was filed and when the Lis Pendens was filed# 
the Plaintiffs nor their attorney had any knowledge that the title 
had been conveyed out of the Kohlers. Mr. Kohler had told Mr. 
Hansen that he had a contract to sell. The Lis Pendens is for the 
sole purpose of giving notice that there was a suit of Hansen v. 
Kohler. 
In the case of Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P. 2d, 405f which is 
a California case# the California statute is almost identical to 
ours/ on page 406, head note #5, 6, and 7, are as follows: 
"5. Lis Pendens key 18. 
The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis 
pendens is to secure the same result as actual 
notice by giving constructive notice of pendency 
of proceedings. West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. 
II 409, 1908, Subd. 2. 
6. Lis Pendens key 22 (1) 
Notice of lis pendens is purely incidental 
to action wherein it is filed, refers specifically 
to such action and has no existence apart 
from it. West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. s 1908, 
subd. 2. 
7 . Libel and Slander key 136 
The recordationof a notice of lis pendens is in 
effect a republication of the pleadings and hence 
is clothed with absolute privilege in action 
for disparagement of title. West's Ann. Code 
Civ. Proc. si 409, 1908, Subd. 2." 
And on page 408, paragraphs 3 4, bottom of paragrpah, is as follows: 
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"Thus, subdivision 2 of section 47 states, the 
long-established rule that publications made in 
the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely 
privileged, Gosewisch v. Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 
513-515, 119 p. 656; Donnell v. Linforth, 11 
Cal. App. 2d 25, 28-29, 52 P. 2d 937; Moore v. 
United States Fid. & Guaranty Co . 122 Cal. App. 
205/210, 9 P. 2d. 562; Rest., Torts, es 635-639." 
And on page 409, in the middle of head note 8, 9, it states: 
"If the publication has a reasonable relation to 
the action and is permitted by law, the absolute 
privilege attaches. See Rest. Torts, s 587; 
Youmans v. Smith 153 N.Y. 214, 220, 47 N. E. 265 
Karushaur v. Lavin, Sup. 39 N.Y.S. 2d 880, 882-
883; Zirn v. Cullom, 187Misc, 241, 63 N.Y.S.2d 
439, 440-441; Inselberg v. Trosty, 190 Misc. 
507, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 457, 458; of 39A.L.R. 2d 
840, 861. It therefore attached to the recordation 
of a notice of lis pendens, for such publication 
is permitted by law, and like other documents that 
may be filed in an action, it has a reasonable 
relation thereto and it is immaterial that it is 
recorded with the County Recorder instead 0f being 
filed with the County Clerk." 
It is our contention that the Lis Pendens is part of the legal 
proceedings under'the common law and the common law was not changed by 
our statute a Lis Pendens is privileged, the same as a lawsuit. 
POINT II 
LIS PENDENS HAS NO EFFECT ON CONVEYANCES MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF 
THE LIS PENDENS 
Our statute pertaining to the Lis Pendens provides that it only 
affects the property and title of the property after the filing of the 
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Lis Pendens. Lis Pendens has no effect on conveyances prior to the 
filing of the Lis Pendens. 
We quote from Section 78-40-2, U.C.A. 9, as follows: 
"From the time of filing such notice for record 
only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of 
its pendency against parties designated by their 
real names." 
In the instant case, the Lis Pendens had no effect on the Deed 
from Kohler to Pierces that was filed prior to the filing of the Lis 
Pendens• 
The following quotations pertain to Lis Pendens, its definition 
and its origin in history. 
In 38 C. J. under Lis Pendens, Section 1, on page 4, gives 
what Lis Pendens was and I quote: 
"A. IN GENERAL. Lis meanj a suit, action, 
controversy, or2dispute, and "Lis Pendens" means 
a pending suit. It is maxim of the commonlaw 
that pendents lite nihil innovetur--pending the suit 
nothing should be changed --and, subject to certain 
limitations and qualifications hereinafter stated, 
one who acquires from a party to the proceeding „ 
an interest in property, which is at that time 
involved in a litigation in a court having 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person 
of the one from whom the interest is acquired, taJces 
subject to the rights of the parties to the litiaation 
as finally determined by the judgment or decree, 
and is as conclusively bound by the result of the 
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Litigation as if he had been a party thereto from the 
outset. This rule with the principles governing its 
application and limitations is technically known as the 
doctrine of lis pendens. " 
We are quoting the above because it shows that under the common 
law that a person subject to a suit was bound to find out what suits, 
if any had been filed affecting tho title to real property. The Utah 
statute provided that the Lis Pendens had to be filed in the Recorder's 
Officef but under the common law there was no notice necessary to be 
given. At 38 C. J. Page 6# paragraph No. 2, the Court says: 
"B. ORIGIN AND HISTORY". While the doctrine of lis 
pendens is commonly referred as having first been 
formulated by Sir Francis Bacon, in 1618 as the twelfth 
of his "Ordinances in Chancery" its exact origin is 
difficult to determine. It was not peculiar to courts 
of equity, and it was common to courts both at law 
and in equity before it was promulagated in the 
"Ordinances in Chancery." It has been said that 
the doctrine of lis pendens was older in law than 
in equity and was adopted from the common law 
courts in analogy to the rule existing in real actions 
to the effect that if "defendant aliens after pendency of 
the writ, the judgment in the action will overrule such 
alienations. " 
C. REASONS FORf AND FOUNDATION OF DOCTRINE — 1 . PUBLIC 
POLICY. It is commonly stated that the doctrine 
of lis pendens is based upon considerations of public 
policy and convenience, the rule being necessary to the 
administration of justice in order that decisions in
 2. 
# pending suits may be binding and may be given full effect 
that there may be an end to litigation, and that the 
purpose of a pending suit may not be^defeated by sucessive 
alienations and transfers of title. 
-34-
2. NOTICE. While the doctrine of lis pendens is frequent-
ly spoken of as one implied or constructive notice, 
the accuracy2of this statement is denied by many 
authorities, its true foundation, according to such 
authorities, resting as has already been stated, upon 
principles of public policy and necessity, which 
forbid a litigant party to give to others pending the 
litigation rights to the property in dispute so an to 
prejudice the opposite party. For practical purposes, 
it is ordinarily immaterial whether the doctrine of 
lis pendens be considered as based on constructive notice or 
on public policy, although if the doctrine is based 
on the theory of necessity and public policy, it 
nay prevent its extension. 
3. RES JUDICATA. Under the view that the doctrine 
of lis pendens is based upon the necessity that 
there may be an end of litigation, it is in 
fact a phase of the law of res judicata, being 
an exception to the rule that^a judgment is conclus-
ive only upon parties thereto to the effect 
that, in certain actions and suits involving^property, 
purchasers pendente lite are also concluded, and 
privies to the judgment rendered so far as the «fi 
consequences are concerned, if not technically so. 
Since the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens „ 
nay be harsh in particular instances and is arbitrary, 
it will not be given effect when the reasons which 
give rise to it do not require its enforcement, 
and the limitations to the rule will be observed 
with the same rigidity as exists in the application 
of the rule itself. On the.other hand, the rule 
admits of but few exceptions. " 
To the common law, it was not necessary to give notice. They were 
just bound by the Judgment. Our statute has changed this rule so that 
to give notice to any siibsequent party dealing with the property that 
you must file it in the Recorder's Office. 
And further on in the same works, 38 C. J. Section 9, page 11, it says: 
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"Where the lis pendens statute has no negative words 
or repealing clause/ it is regarded as supplemental 
to the common law and not as repealing it, so that the 
common law will-govern in all cases not covered 
by the statute. Where a statute does not require a 
notice to be filed the common-law rule of notice arising 
from the commencement of the action itself prevails. " 
Our Utah Lis Pendens statute only gives notice after it is filed 
but if it had been filed a few hours earlier, it would have given 
notice that any interest that Mr. Kohler tried to convey after the 
filing of the Lis Pendens would have been subject to Plaintiffs' lien. 
POINT III 
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE FALSE AND CONTAIN FALSE ALLEGATIONS. 
TO HAVE SLANDER OF TITLE THE INSTRUMENT CB THE WORD SPOKEN HAS TO BE 
FALSE. 
At 53 C. J. Section 273, page 393, it states: 
"273. FAL3ITT. 
The falsity of the words spoken is an essential 
element of a cause of action for slander of title. 
The falsity of the words published is a necessary 
element to maintain an action for slander of title. 
If the alleged defect or infirmity in title or property 
exists, the action will not lie. 'however malicious 
the intent to injure may have been. Indeed, it has 
been held that in order to constitute malice there must be 
a false statement. " 
In the instant case, there is no false statement. Everything that 
was said in the Complaint is true. 
We have a Utah case which holds that if the allegations are true 
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there is no grounds for slander of title. It is the case of Pender v. 
Dowse, 265 Pacific 2d. 664 on page 649, the Court says: 
"For one to be liable for slander of title he must 
publish 'matter which is untrue and disparaging 
to another's property in land-' (Emphasis ours) 
See Restatement of the Law on Torts. Vol. Ill, 
Sea. 624, and in Section 634 it is stated thus: 
'The publisher of matter disparaging to 
another's property in land, chattels 
or intangible things or to the quality 
thereof is not libale under the rule 
stated in sees. 624 and 626-7 unless the 
disparaging matter, if a statement of 
fact, is untrue, or if an expression of 
opinion is dishonestly made.' 
Here Dowse had a valid judgment for costs against 
Pender. His acts in having the execution issued, 
levying on the property and having it sold at 
sheriff's sale all reflected the true nature of 
the claim, that is that these actions were taken to 
satisfy a judgment for costs in the sum of $22.80 
and expenses incurred. These facts appeared upon 
the record and were all trUe. Being true, they could 
not be the basis for a suit for slander of title 
and the court therefore erred in granting attorney 
fees as special damages for slander of title and punitive 
damages for the malice involved." 
We submit that the basis for slander of title would have to be the 
allegations in the Complaint. We submit that everything in the Complaint 
was borne out by the evidence and by the facts even to.the allegation 
that he "understood the property had been sold. That there should be no 
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question that Mr. Hansen had the right to assume that he was entitled 
to recover from Mr. Kohler because he had a decision from the real 
estate board that he was entitled to recover $4,686.00 from Mr. Kohler. 
(Exhibit 24). 
That there has been a complete disclosure to counsel and counsel 
is the one who prepared the complaint and prepared the Lis Pendens. 
POINT IV 
FOR THERE TO BE A CAUSE OF ACTION, THERE MUST BE MALICE. 
We submit to this court that there is nothing in the record that 
shows that there was any malice. 
At 53 C.J.S. under Libel and Slander, Section 274, Page 394, it 
states: 
"274. MALICE 
Malice is a necessary ingredient in order to entitle 
the plaintiff to recover for slander of title. 
Malice is a necessary ingredient in order to entitle 
the plaintiff to recover for slander of title.'2 
Indeed, it has been said that malice is the gist of 170 » 
the action.0 Such malice, however, may be express 
or implied. * The action cannot be maintained if the 
claim was asserted by defendant in good faith, and if the 
act complained of was founded on probable cause or was 
prompted by a reasonable belief although the state-
ment may have been false. Thus the action cannot 
be maintained if the claim was asserted by defendant 
in good faith on the advice of counsel/? especially 
where defendant had revealed the material facts fully 
and correctly to counsel,™ and bad faith on the part 
of counsel is immaterial.'9" 
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In this case, not only did the Hansens make a full disclosure 
to counsel, but they filed a Complaint before the Real Estate Board 
(Exhibit 9), and the Real Estate Board held that Kohlers should 
make a settlement by Kohlers paying to the Hansens $4,686.00, 
(Exhibit 24), which the Kohlers refused to pay. 
The complaint (letter) of the Hansens to the Real Estate 
Commissions (Exhibit 9), has substantially the same allegations 
that are set out in the Complaint. 
The opening statement of defendant's counsel (R. 5,6, 7) and 
the Kohlers' Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, (R. 268), have 
the same facts with the exception that Kohlers and their counsel 
contended that Hansen only had a thirty-day period to get the 
property back. 
That the Complaint and the Lis Pendens were prepared by counsel 
and the evidence sustains the facts alleged in the Complaint. However, 
the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not have a cause of 
action. 
The suit in which the Lis Pendens was filed was the case of 
Hansen v. Kohler and there was nothing said in regards to the Pierces, 
and whether or not they had good title. If the Pierces got their 
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Deed on record before the Hansens' Lis Pendens, then they were 
first in time, and under our statute, their title was not affected by 
the Lis Pendens. 
That under the Lis Pendens Statute, 78-49-2, the Lis Pendens 
may be filed at the time of or after the filing of the Complaint. 
The filing of a Lis Pendens before the filing of a Complaint or 
without a Complaint could be actionable. Counsel inquired (Exhibit 
P. 30), before the filing of the Complaint and sending the Lis Pendens 
to see if the property was still in the name of Kohler. 
In the Utah case of Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P. 2d 510, allowed 
recovery, but it did not change the law that we are contending for 
and on page 521, it states: 
"The Defendant and appellant, Leslie Kidman, 
contends that the Utah Cases and the law generally 
regarding slander of title require that before 
liability can be found the recorder of the 
slanderous document must have known that he 
asserted a false claim without any foundation or 
right." 
We cited the case of C. Ed. Lewis v. Dragos, 266 P. 2d. 499, 
1 U. 2d, 328. This is the case where the defendants made statements 
that the Motel was on his property, but the case to determine this 
fact was on appeal to the Supreme Court and the Court on page 500 states: 
"Under the circumstances, we feel that such 
statements made by one of the litigants concerning 
the subject matter of litigation are not and should 
not be construed as a slander of title nor a tortious 
interference with a possible contractual right of 
stranger to the title." 
-/in. 
There is nothing in this record that shows any malice or any 
meanness on the part of the Hansens. They were acting honestly. 
We have set out in the Brief, the letter of Mr. Roe,(Exhibit 21) 
the letter of Mr. Hadfield (Exhibit 22), and the opinion of Attorney 
0. Dee Lund, (R. 228, Exhibit 23), all of whom were of the opinion that 
the Lis Pendens was not a cloud on the title. 
The Farm Home Administration, for some reason not disclosed by 
the record, did not want to release their mortgage and take a second 
mortgage, although the opinion of three attorneys was that the title 
was marketable. This did not matter anyway because there was a sub-
sequent deal in which the Pierces were to be paid more money than they 
were to be paid under the Nicholas deal. 
Plaintiff's attorney has always been of the opinion that the Lis 
Pendens would not be a cloud on the title. (R.248 ) All the effect 
it would have would be is if the Lis Pendens had been filed before 
Kohler's interest in the property was conveyed. Then it would have 
been a lien on his interest. That there was no actual request ever 
made of plaintiff to remove the Lis Pendens or telling what trouble 
they were having with their title. There was no prayer in the Cross 
Complaint and Counterclaim that a cloud should be removed. The reason 
is not clear, but the second insurance company did not want to insure the 
title, but there was never any reason given. 
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At the time of this deal there was never anything said to 
Hansens or their attorney about the troubles that Pierces were 
having. The alleged conversation with the Hansen's attorney 
occurred after that and after the Pierces had taken back the property. 
That in the Contract to Purchase between Kohlers and Pierces, 
(Exhibit 11)# it sets out in paragraph No. 6: "It is understood 
that there presently exists an obligation against said property 
in favor of First Security Bank of Tremonton with an unpaid balance 
of $ as of Date 6/21/67." That the Pierces knew at the time they 
entered into the contract to purchase that there was not a clear title, 
and if there had been any inquiry made at that time, they could have 
found out about the troubles that Kohler and Hansens were having. 
A Motion for Summary Judgment against the Intervenors and Counter-
claimants was made, (R. 362), supported by Affidavit of Marvin W. 
Hansen. (R. 360-361). A supplemental Affidavit was made (R. 365 to 
372), and a Memorandum of Authorities was filed (R. 373 to 377). 
This raises the same questions that we have raised in part II 
of the Brief and we sufcmit that the Motion for Summary Judgment 
should have been granted and that the evidence at the time of the 
trial did not vary the evidence as set out in the affidavits and 
exhibits. 
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PART III 
DAMAGES 
The Court awarded damages for (1) attorney feesf (2) damages 
for travelling expenses for the taking of the deposition and other 
expenses connected with taking the deposition and (3) loss of rent, 
(R. 458). 
We will argue the damages for attorney fees and the damages for 
travelling expenses for taking the deposition together because we think 
these elements come under the same rule that a person would be 
entitled to their attorney fees and their costs only in removing 
a cloud# no award of attorney fees in a damage suit for slander of 
title. 
POINT I 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS OF DEPOSITION 
Damages can only be awarded for the removal of the cloud from 
the property not for the recovery of damages for the slander of title 
There was no motion filed in this case asking that the cloud be 
removed. There was no written notice# no written letter to the 
Hansens asking that the purported cloud be removed. No Complaint 
was filed to remove the cloud. Nothing was done by the firm of 
Vlahos and Gale or Mr. Knowlton to remove the cloud. Everything that 
was done was to recover damages. 
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The Cross Complaint (R. 319 to 324) is entirely a suit for 
damages. There is not one sentence or one word in the Cross Complaint 
which asks for the removal of a cloud on the title. 
The expenses of deposition and attorney fees were incurred for 
the purpose of recovering damages, not for the removal of any alleged 
cloud. The deposition of the Interveners was taken because of the 
suit for damages. 
We know of no case in Utah which gives attorney fees in a 
damage suit. No litigant is entitled to attorney fees if it is 
not provided by statute or by written instrument or when there has 
been money expended to remove a cloud or for the release of a 
wrongful attachment or garnishment and then only that portion which 
is used for the removal of the cloud or release of the wrongful 
attachment or garnishment, not the main case. 
There is no evidence of any attorney fees being incurred or 
any depositions being taken for the purpose of removing the cloud. 
There was no conversations by the Pierces attorney with theHansens 
or their attorney asking that the cloud be removed. There is no 
written demand upon plaintiff Hansens to remove the alleged cloud nor 
were there any pleadings alleging a cloud or asking that it be removed. 
We submit that the only thing in the Cross Complaint is allegations 
i 
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for damage. There was nothing in the depositions pertaining to 
the removal of the cloud, it all pertained to damages. 
We have Utah cases which hold that a person is entitled to 
attorney fees for removing a cloud but not for attorney fees for 
damages for slander of title. 
In the case of Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.f 208 P.2d 956f 116 U. 
106f this court holds that for the removal of the cloud an allowance 
of attorney fees is proper and the court on page 957 says: 
"* * * * and was compelled to commence a suit 
to remove the cloud from his title and to employ 
counsel to do so at a cost of $250,00i" 
This clearly holds that they would be entitled to attorney fees for 
removal of the cloud, but not entitled to attorney fees in a general 
damage suit for slander of title. 
To the same affect is the case of Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 
510. The same doctrine applies to a suit to dissolve an attach-
ment. The attorney fees for dissolving the attachement would be 
proper damages, but not for defending the main suit. 
The Court says in the case of Sproul v. Parks, 210 P.2d 436f 
on page 439: 
"True, the release of the mortgage by the loan 
company was not executed until after the filing 
of the defendants' counterclaim; but no suit had 
been prosecuted by defendant to clear the title 
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to the realty, nor was there any prayer for such 
relief in the counter-claim. * * * that in 
circumstances where collateral proceeding were 
prosecuted to judgment to clear title to property 
from an encumbrance, and a subsequent action for 
disparagement of title were successfully maintained 
there should properly be allowed as compensatory 
damages in the latter suit, an amount for attorneys' 
fees reasonably incurred in both actions. The 
authorities will not support such an award," 
Pierces are asking for damages for the costs of coming to Salt 
Lake City to take their depositions and travelling expenses when the 
Pierces filed the counterclaim, they were not residents of Utah. 
That they are in substance the plaintiffs in the action for damages 
and they being the plaintiffs in the action are not entitled to 
their expenses of taking their depositions because it is a damage 
case# and certainly they were not entitled to witness fees during 
the time of the trial. 
We have the statute 21-5-4 which allows the recovery of witness 
fees, but the case annotated under that section specifically holds 
that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a witness fee. In the case of 
I.X.L, Stores Co., vs Moon, 162 P. 622, 49 U 262, at page 624, the Court 
says: 
"As a matter of course it is generally held that 
a party to an action, although he may testify in the 
case, is not to be classified as a witness within 
the purview of the foregoing sectionf and is therefore 
not entitled to include costs for himslef as a witness 
as part of the taxable costs." 
RENT 
The Hansens at no time interferred with the usef access or 
possession of the property and so the Pierces would not be entitled 
to damages for rent. The property was entirely under the control of 
the Pierces as to what was done with it. 
The Pierces had no cause of action nor did they attempt a cause 
of action for the possession and control of the property. They still 
had the control of the property at the time of the trial. They had a 
deal to dell the property if it was not for their own actions in 
not paying the taxes and allowing a judgment to be docketed against 
the property, the deal would have been consummated. 
Hansens did no act and there is no act claimed that prevented 
the Pierces from renting the property* or use it in any manner they saw 
fit. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Hansens relied upon Mr. Kohler, the real estate agentf to 
close the deal between him and the Robinsons and executed the deeds 
to Mr. and Mrs. Kohler at the request of Mr. Robinson. Kohler was 
to hold the deeds as trustee, until the deal was closed. 
That in the second deal, the Howell property was to be held as 
security for the payment of the Kohlers commission by Hansens or 
until the property was sold. Then the Kohlers were to make an 
accounting to the Hansens. Kohlers breached this confidential 
relationship and told them they would have to sue. Mr. Hansen filed 
a complaint with the real estate board and the real estate board 
held that Mr. Kohler should pay Hansens the sum of $4,686-00. The 
Kohlers have been unjustly enriched. 
The Hansens had a perfect right to sue Kohler and were so 
advised by the real estate board. 
That Hansens made a full disclosure to counsel and counsel 
prepared the Complaint and the Lis Pendens against the Kohlers. 
The Pierces were not a party to the lawsuit and their title was 
in no manner questioned. 
Under the Utah Statutes, the Hansens had a right to file the 
Lis Pendens so if there was any interest in the property still in 
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the Kohlersf that it would be subject to any Judgment that the 
Hansens may recover. At no time did they do any act which cast 
any cloud upon the Pierces title or ownership to the property. 
The lawsuit was against the Kohlers not the Pierces and the statute 
specifically gave them the right to file a Lis Pendens. 
The Hansens were never asked to release the Lis Pendens or 
told that it was a cloud on their title or of any difficulties 
Pierces were having. 
That there was no notice, no pleadings, no work done by the 
attorneys, Vlahos and Gale or Knowlton, or any expenses incurred 
to remove the cloud. The only act that was taken by Vlahos and Gale 
and Knowlton was to file a cross complaint for damages. No expenses 
were incurred by Pierces to remove any alleged cloud. No damages or 
expenses were incurred or any act done to remove any cloud. That 
nothing was done by the Hansens which in any way interfered with the 
possession of the property by the Pierces. The only expenses 
incurred were the expenses incurred by the Pierces to obtain a 
Judgment for damages from the Hansens. 
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